A Hierarchical Secure Routing Protocol Against Black Hole Attacks in Sensor Networks by Yin, Jian & Madria, Sanjay Kumar
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
Scholars' Mine 
Computer Science Faculty Research & Creative 
Works Computer Science 
01 Jan 2006 
A Hierarchical Secure Routing Protocol Against Black Hole 
Attacks in Sensor Networks 
Jian Yin 
Sanjay Kumar Madria 
Missouri University of Science and Technology, madrias@mst.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsmine.mst.edu/comsci_facwork 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
J. Yin and S. K. Madria, "A Hierarchical Secure Routing Protocol Against Black Hole Attacks in Sensor 
Networks," Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Sensor Networks, Ubiquitous, and 
Trustworthy Computing (SUTC'06), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), Jan 2006. 
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1109/SUTC.2006.1636203 
This Article - Conference proceedings is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars' Mine. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Computer Science Faculty Research & Creative Works by an authorized administrator of 
Scholars' Mine. This work is protected by U. S. Copyright Law. Unauthorized use including reproduction for 
redistribution requires the permission of the copyright holder. For more information, please contact 
scholarsmine@mst.edu. 
A Hierarchical Secure Routing Protocol against Black Hole Attacks 
in Sensor Networks* 
Jian Yin and Sanjay Kumar Madria 
Department of Computer Science, University of Missouri-Rolla, MO 65401, USA 
{jian, madrias}@umr.edu
Abstract
A black hole attack is a severe attack that can be 
easily employed against routing in sensor networks. In 
a black hole attack, a malicious node spuriously 
announces a short route to the sink node (the 
destination) to attract additional traffic to the 
malicious node and then drops them. In this paper, we 
propose a hierarchical secure routing protocol for 
detecting and defending against black hole attacks. The 
proposed protocol uses only symmetric key 
cryptography to discover a safe route against black 
hole attacks. The comparison of the proposed protocol 
with two other existing approaches proves that the 
proposed scheme is faster in detecting black hole 
attacks with much lower message overhead. 
Keywords Black hole attack, Sensor networks  
1. Introduction
Many sensor network applications, such as border 
security application [1], run in untrustworthy 
environments, which require secure communication [2-
4] against different types of attacks. However, 
traditional security protocols [5] are designed for 
resource rich machines with large computation, which 
are not applicable to sensor networks due to resource 
limitation. Secure routing in sensor networks presents 
challenges due to low computing power, small memory, 
limited bandwidth, and especially very limited energy 
[6]. A black hole attack [5] is a severe attack that can 
be easily employed against routing in sensor networks. 
In a black hole attack, a malicious node spuriously 
announces a short route to the sink node in order to 
attract additional traffic to the malicious node and then 
drops them. The black hole attack forms a serious 
threat as data packets are dropped by the black hole 
node.  
In this paper, a hierarchical secure routing protocol 
(HSRBH) for detecting and defending against black 
hole attacks is presented. It uses only symmetric key 
 *This research is partially supported by Intelligent 
Research Center, UMR, and NSF (EIA-0323630).  
cryptography to discover a safe route against black 
hole attacks. In the HSRBH protocol, the sensor 
network is divided into different groups with one group 
leader in each group through the localized self-
organization process. Group members are organized in 
a tree structure with a group leader as the root. An 
intra-group shared key among the neighbors of the 
group leader and an inter-group shared key between the 
two neighboring group leaders are established. Most of 
the black hole attacks are detected only locally. To 
detect the black hole attacks which are caused by the 
cooperation between the group leader and its neighbor, 
the randomized data acknowledgement scheme is 
proposed. The proposed HSRBH protocol is robust 
against black hole attacks. Comparing with the two 
existing schemes AODVBH [5] and CoBH [7], the 
HSRBH scheme detects the black holes faster while 
establishing the route with much lower communication 
overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 gives a motivating example. Section 3 
presents the system model. Section 4 describes the 
HSRBH protocol. Section 5 gives the theoretical 
analysis. Section 6 provides the performance 
evaluations. Section 7 gives related work, and section 8 
concludes the paper. 
2. Motivating Example 
In the border security application, sensor nodes are 
deployed along the border area, which monitor the 
border and send the information only if they detect new 
events such as people crossing the border. Heidemann 
et al. [8] mentioned that ad hoc routing such as AODV 
and DSR can be used in sensor networks. However, the 
table driven scheme [9] is energy consuming since the 
route update must be done frequently. That’s the reason 
our HSRBH scheme uses on-demand routing scheme.  
2.1. Problem Statement 
In a black hole attack, a malicious node spuriously 
announces a short route to the sink node in order to 
attract additional traffic to it and then drops them. It 
sends route replies immediately after receiving the 
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route request even though it does not have any route. If 
the route reply from the malicious node reaches the 
source node earlier, the source node establishes the 
route to the sink node through the malicious node. 
Normally the route reply from the malicious node can 
have more chances to be accepted by the source node. 
The black hole attack forms a serious threat as data 
packets are dropped by the black hole node.  
3. System Model 
This section provides the system model based on 
the system description, localized self-organization and 
key establishment.  
3.1. System Description 
Two types of sensor nodes are deployed in the sensor 
network [10]: level-0 and level-1 sensor nodes. The 
level-1 nodes are manually deployed [11]. The 
distribution of level-1 nodes is roughly uniform. The 
number of level-1 nodes is 10-20% of the total number 
of sensor nodes. We assume that all the level-0 and 
level-1 nodes are preloaded with a global initial key K0
in memory. Besides, each node holds its individual 
secret key shared with the sink node. Each node has a 
unique identity (ID) and a preloaded pseudo-random 
function f [4]. We assume that the sink node is secure 
and trusted, whereas all other sensor nodes can be 
compromised. However, we assume there is a lower 
bound on the time interval Tmin (about several seconds 
[4]) that is necessary for an adversary to compromise a 
node. Table 1 provides the notation description. 
Table 1. Notation description 
Notation Description 
A, B Principles, such as sensor nodes 
M1|M2 The concatenation of messages M1 and M2
KAB The secret shared key shared between A and 
B
KA The secret key held by A
MAC(K,M) The message authentication code of 
message M using a symmetric key K [12] 
EK(M) Encryption of message M with key K [13] 
fK(u) A pseudo-random function with inputs of 
symmetric key K and the identity of node u 
NA A nonce generated by node A, which is a 
random number 
IDA The identity of node A
3.2. Localized Self-Organization 
The level-1 nodes as the group leaders start the 
localized self-organization by sending a hello message 
<IDG|NG|MAC(K0,IDG|NG)>, where IDG is the group 
leader’s ID, and NG is a nonce. Each node (say node A) 
only accepts the first verified hello message through 
MAC. The receiver A sets the sender as its parent. It 
then sends a reply message <IDA|IDG|NG|
MAC(K0,IDA|IDG|NG)> to the sender. It also broadcasts 
the updated hello message <IDA|IDG|NA|MAC(K0,
IDA|IDG|NA)>. The group leader accepts the verified 
reply message through MAC and sets the node A as its 
child. This process is recursively continued. When a 
sensor node receives a hello message, it must decide 
whether it stops broadcasting it. If it has received a 
hello message from other group leaders earlier, it stops 
broadcasting. After a certain time, it reports its all 
group leaders about all other group leader’s ID. Then 
the localized self-organization process ends. After the 
localized self-organization process, group members are 
organized in a tree structure with the group leader as 
the root. The information stored in each group leader 
includes (a) one-hop neighbors’ ID, and (b) its 
neighbor group leader’s ID. The information stored in 
other sensor nodes includes (a) parent node’s ID, (b) 
child node’s ID, and (c) group leader’s ID.
3.3. Key Establishment 
This section provides inter-group shared key 
establishment between two neighboring group leaders 
and intra-group shared key establishment among the 
one-hop neighbors of the group leader. 
3.3.1. Inter-group Shared Key Establishment. First,
the group leader derives its own secret key  IDf K0 [4]. 
Second, it derives its neighboring group leaders’ secret 
key  IDf K0 , where ID is its neighboring group 
leaders’ ID. Third, it establishes the inter-group shared 
key with its neighboring group leaders. Let node A0
and B0 be group leaders. The shared key KAB




ID , node A0





Node B0 computes KAB as  00 AKAB IDfK B 
independently. Fourth, after a specified time (much less 
than Tmin), all sensor nodes other than the sink node 
remove K0, f and all secret keys of other nodes. 
3.3.2. Intra-group Shared Key Establishment. The 
group leader sends the message {ID|IDR|MAC(K0,
ID|IDR)} to its one-hop neighbors, where IDR  is a 
random ID. The neighbors then verify the 
authentication of the message through MAC. Then the 
neighbors establish the intra-group shared key  RK IDf 0 .
Finally, the group leader A0 removes the initial key K0,
the random function f, and random identity IDR.
Therefore, only the neighbors of the group leader share 
the intra-group shared key. 
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4. Secure Routing Protocol against Black 
Hole Attacks 
This section provides the HSRBH protocol. We 
first give an overview (Section 4.1) and then provide 
the detailed protocol (Section 4.2). 
4.1. An Overview 
After the localized self-organization and key 
establishment process, the sensor network is divided 
into groups. Each group has a group leader. An intra-
group shared key among neighbors of the group leader 
and an inter-group shared key between the two 
neighboring group leaders are established.  
In the HSRBH protocol, the source node initiates 
the route discovery process through sending a route 
request (RREQ) to the sink node. When the sink node 
or an intermediate group leader having a fresh enough 
route receives the RREQ, it generates a route reply 
(RREP) and sends it to the source node. Each RREP
includes the message authentication code (MAC) 
which is calculated using the inter-group shared key. 
For each RREP packet, two verification steps are 
executed as follows. First step, the neighbor of the 
group leader who generates the RREP packet must 
make the verification through sending a further 
verification message to the next hop of the group leader 
on the route to the sink node. The further verification 
message includes a MAC, which is calculated using 
intra-group shared key. The next hop receiving the 
verification message sends the verification result to the 
sender. If the verification succeeds, the node forwards 
the RREP packet to its previous node. Otherwise, if the 
verification fails or the node did not get the verification 
result within a certain time, the node drops the RREP
packet. Second step, the neighboring group leader 
receiving the RREP packet must verify the 
authentication of the RREP packet through MAC since 
only the two neighboring group leaders share their 
inter-group shared key. If the verification succeeds, the 
neighboring group leader forwards the RREP packet to 
its previous node. Otherwise, it must drop it.  
The nodes between two neighboring group leaders 
send the RREP packet immediately after receiving the 
RREQ packet even though they do not have any route 
to make the black hole attack. These attacks can be 
locally detected using the two verification steps. 
The most challenging black hole attack is made by 
the collusion between the group leader and other nodes. 
The black hole node’s goal is to drop the packets. We 
use the randomized data acknowledgement mechanism 
to detect this attack. In this mechanism, the source 
node randomly sends the control message to the sink 
node to send the acknowledgement. The 
acknowledgement includes the MAC using the shared 
key between the source node and the sink node. If the 
source node can receive the acknowledgement and the 
verification succeeds, the route is secure against the 
black hole.  Otherwise, the route is considered to have 
a black hole node inside. Then the source node adds the 
node generating the RREP to its black list. The source 
node will not accept any RREP from the nodes in the 
black list.  
After the secure route discovery, each node on the 
route has built the appropriate routing table, which 
includes the next hop on the route to the sink node.  
4.2. Protocol Description 
This section gives a detailed description of HSRBH 
including a route request process, a route reply process, 
a data acknowledgement process, and a route 
maintenance process. 
4.2.1. Route Request. Source node (S) initiates the 
route discovery by broadcasting RREQ as follows:  
S o  *:IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS|
MAC(KS,IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS)
where IDRREQ is a random number and Seq is the 
sequence number. When the intermediate node (node I) 
receives it, six cases will be considered:  
Case 1: If the RREQ is not from its group leader and it 
is not the parent of the sending node, it drops it.  
Case 2: If the RREQ is not from its group leader but it 
is the parent of the sending node, and if it has already 
received the same packet, it drops it. If it has not 
receive it, it updates its routing table to add IDsend, IDS,
IDsink and IDRREQ.  Here IDsend is the ID of the sending 
node. Then it sends the RREQ as follows: 
I o  *:IDI|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS|
MAC(KS, IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS)
Case 3: If the RREQ is originally from its group leader 
and it is not the child of the sending node or it has 
received the RREQ before, it drops it.  
Case 4: If the RREQ is originally from its group leader 
and it is the child of the sending node, and if it has not 
received it before, it updates its routing table with 
IDsend, IDS, IDsink and IDRREQ. Then it sends the RREQ:
I o  *:IDI|IDG|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS|
MAC(KS, IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS)
Case 5: If it is the group leader which receives the 
RREQ and if it has received it before, it drops it.  
Case 6: If it is the group leader which receives the 
RREQ and if it has not received it before, it checks its 
routing table to determine whether it has a fresh 
enough route. If it has a fresh route, it generates a 
RREP to the source node S. If it has no fresh route, it 
updates its routing table with IDsend, IDS, IDsink and 
IDRREQ. Then it sends the updated RREQ as follows: 
G o  *:IDG|IDs|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS|
MAC(KS, IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|NS)
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When the sink node receives the RREQ, it derives 
the source node S secret key  SKS IDfK 0 . It only 
accepts the RREQ with the valid MAC, which first 
reaches it. If Seq is bigger than the same route stored in 
its routing table, it updates the routing table to store IDS,
IDRREQ, Seq, and the previous group leader’s ID.
Finally, it sends the RREP to the source node. 
4.2.2. Route Reply. As shown in Figure 1, if the sink 
node generates a RREP, it sends the RREP as follows: 
Sink o  C: IDP|IDC|IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N|
MAC(K<C, sink>, IDS| IDsink| IDRREQ| Seq|N|IDC)|
MAC(KS, IDS| IDsink| IDRREQ|Seq|N)
where IDP is the ID of the previous node, IDC is the ID
of the previous group leader and K<C, sink> is the inter-
group shared key between C and the sink node.  
If the intermediate group leader generates a RREP
packet, it sends the RREP packet as follows: 
C o  B: IDP|IDB|IDC| 2CID | IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N|
MAC(KBC, IDS|IDsink|IDRREQ|Seq|N| 2CID |IDC|IDB)| 
where IDP is the ID of the previous node, IDB is the ID 
of the previous group leader B, IDC is the ID of the 
sending group leader C, 
2C
ID  is the ID of the next node 
C2.
When the previous node of the group leader 
receives the RREP generated by the group leader, it 
sends a verification message to the next hop of the 
group leader as follows: 
C1 o  C2: 1CID | 2CID | IDS|IDsink| Seq|
MAC(
21CC
K , IDS| IDsink| Seq| 1CID | 2CID )
where 
1C
ID is the ID of the previous node, 
2C
ID  is the 
ID of the next hop, and 
21CC
K  is the intra-group key 
among the neighbors of the group leader C. 
 The next hop of the group leader sends the 
verification result to the previous node of the group 
leader as follows: 
C2 o  C1: 1CID | 2CID |IDS|IDsink|Seq|Rverify|MAC( 21CCK ,
IDS| IDsink| Seq| 1CID | 2CID |Rverify)
Where Rverify is the result of verification. If C2 has fresh 
enough route to sink, Rverify is YES. Otherwise, it is NO.
If the verification result is NO, the next hop of the 
group leader has no fresh enough route and node C1
drops the RREP. If the verification result is YES, the 
next hop of the group leader has a fresh route. Then the 
RREP is sent to the previous node. The intermediate 
node receiving it updates its routing table. 
When the group leader receives the RREP, it 
verifies the first MAC to make sure it is from the next 
group leader. If the verification fails, it drops it. If the 
ID of the previous group leader embedded in the RREP
is not the ID of the current group leader, it drops it. 
Otherwise, it updates its routing table. Then, if the 
RREP is originally from the sink node, the group leader 
sends the RREP as follows (in Figure 1): 
B o  A:
1B





ID is the ID of the previous node B1, A and B 
are the neighboring group leaders, and 
2B
ID  is the ID 
of the next node B2.
If the RREP is originally from the intermediate 
group leader C, it sends the RREP as follows: 
Bo A:
1B




ID is the ID of the previous node B1, A and B 
are the neighboring group leaders, 
2B
ID  is the ID of the 
next node B2, and IDC is the ID of the node who 
generates the RREP.
S A B SinkCB2 C2C1
Group Leader Neighbor of Group Leader Sensor
B1
Figure 1. Route discovery 
When the source node receives the RREP, it 
verifies the first MAC. If the RREP has not been 
tampered with, the source node inserts the ID of the 
next hop on the route and the ID of the node who 
generates the RREP packet to its routing table. If the 
source node cannot receive the RREP within a 
specified period, it triggers another route discovery. 
4.2.3. Data Acknowledgement. The data 
acknowledgement mechanism is used to detect the 
black hole attack due to the collusion between the 
group leader and other nodes.  It is designed based on 
the observation that the black hole node will drop the 
data packets during the data dissemination process. The 
data acknowledgement mechanism includes two phases: 
control message forwarding phase, data 
acknowledgement phase. 
Control Message Forwarding Source node sends the 
data packets to the sink node at a message rate Rd. Here 
the message rate is defined as the number of the 
messages per minute. It also sends control message to 
the sink node at a message rate Rc. Rc can be changed 
within a small range randomly and is designed much 
smaller than Rd to decrease message overhead. The 
control message includes the information to ask the 
sink node to send the acknowledgement, which is 
carefully crafted. For example, the control message can 
be of the same size as of data packet. It is encrypted. 
The control message is sent as follows: 
S o  Sink: IDN|IDC|IDS|IDsink|NS|  ME SK |
MAC(KS,IDS|IDsink|NS|  ME SK )
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where, IDN is the ID of the next hop on the route, and 
node C is the group leader generating the RREP.
Data Acknowledgement The sink node sends the 
acknowledgement as follows: 
Sink o  S: IDP|IDS|IDsink|NS|NSink|
MAC(KS,IDS|IDsink|NS|NSink)
Here, IDP is the ID of the previous hop in the route. 
If the source node receives the acknowledgement 
and passes the verification through MAC, the route is 
secure against black hole attack. Only the sink node 
can create the correct MAC using KS since only the 
source node and the sink node holds the source node’s 
secret key KS. If the verification fails, the source node 
will suspect that the route may not be secure against 
black hole attacks. To further confirm this judgment, 
the source node sends further control messages more 
frequently at a message rate ccR  (Rc< ccR <Rd). If it can 
not get the correct acknowledgement within a threshold 
time, the source node can be sure that the route is not 
secure against black hole attacks. It then adds the group 
leader which generates the RREP into black hole list. If 
it can successfully receive the data acknowledgement 
within a threshold time, the route is secure against 
black hole attacks. 
 Note that messages could be lost either because of 
the black hole attack or because of the collision. But 
we assume in this paper that collision could be handled 
[14]. For example, the sending node can resend the 
data packets when it finds that the data packet is lost 
because of the collision. But the black hole node will 
not send the data packets again after it drops them 
since its objective is to drop the packets to disrupt the 
sensor network. 
4.2.4. Route Maintenance. If a sensor node wants to 
send data to the sink node and there is no route 
information in its routing table, it initiates the route 
discovery. If the source node gets the error message 
after it sends data or routing packet, or the threshold 
time for the data acknowledgement is expired, or run 
out of the specified waiting time from the last route 
discovery, it triggers another route discovery. It never 
accepts RREP generated by the group leader in its 
black hole list. 
5. Theoretical Analysis 
This section gives security analysis against 
different types of black hole attacks, and cost analysis. 
5.1. Security Analysis 
In our sensor network architecture, four types of 
black hole attacks could occur: (1) A single node other 
than the group leader makes the black hole attack; (2) 
Several nodes between two neighboring group leaders 
collude to make the black hole attack; (3) A single 
group leader makes the black hole attack; (4) The 
group leader colludes with its neighbors to make the 
black hole attack. 
5.1.1. Single Node other than the Group Leader 
Makes the Black Hole Attack. In Figure 2, node S is 
the source node, nodes A and B are the neighboring 
group leaders. When the malicious node M1 receives 
the RREQ, it immediately sends the RREP to node A 
even it does not have fresh route to the sink. In our 
secure routing protocol, group leader A receives the 
RREP and verifies whether the RREP is from its 
neighboring group leader. Only group leader B or A 
can generate the correct RREP with MAC calculated 
using KAB since only group leader A and its 
neighboring group leader B shares an inter-group 
shared key KAB. If M1 generates the RREP after it 
receives the RREQ, the group leader A can detect it 
immediately through the verification of MAC.
S A B Sink
Group Leader Malicious Node Sensor
M1 M2
Figure 2. Black hole attack 
5.1.2. Multiple Nodes between Two Neighboring 
Group Leaders Collude to Make a Black Hole 
Attack. In [5], the author wants to detect whether 
RREP is from the black hole node by sending further 
RREQ to its next hop node M2. But if the next hop 
node M2 is also a malicious node, called a colluding 
black hole attack, the [5] does not provide any solution 
to this problem. Our secure routing protocol can detect 
this kind of colluding black hole attack where several 
malicious nodes collude to act as black holes between 
two neighboring group leaders. This is because the 
group leader A can verify RREP through MAC using 
the shared key KAB, which is shared between two group 
leaders A and B. 
5.1.3. Single Group Leader Makes the Black Hole 
Attack. The HSRBH protocol can detect this kind of 
attack using local verification. When one of the group 
leader’s neighbors receives the RREP, it verifies the 
authenticity of the route from the next hop of the group 
leader in the path to the sink. If the group leader is part 
of the black hole attack, the verification result will be 
“NO”. This verification result can not be tampered by 
the group leader since it does not have the intra-shared 
key of its neighbors. The spoofed RREP will not be 
forwarded to the next group leader by the node that had 
received the RREP earlier. 
5.1.4. Group Leader Colludes with its Neighbors to 
Make a Black Hole Attack. The probability of this 
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kind of black hole attack is low since the attacker needs 
special effort to conquer multiple nodes’ key. However, 
our proposed secure routing protocol can also detect 
this kind of attack through data acknowledgement 
process. The source node randomly sends control 
messages and waits for the data acknowledgement 
from the sink node. The data acknowledgement is 
signed through MAC using the source node’s secret 
key, which is executed only by the source node or the 
sink node since only they hold the source node’s secret 
key.
5.2. Cost Analysis 
This section gives the computational complexity 
and storage overhead analysis. Define N as the total 
number of sensor nodes, NG as the number of groups, 
Nnb as the average number of neighboring groups for 
each group leader, and M as the number of nodes to 
make black hole attacks.  
5.2.1. Computational Complexity. The worst case is 
that none of group leaders have the fresh enough route 
to the destination. The source node sends the RREQ
once to start the secure route discovery process, thus 
the computational cost is O(1). Each intermediate 
sensor node only accepts the first RREQ, then 
broadcasts it, thus the total cost is O(N-2). The cost that 
the sink node generates RREP is O(1). Since the 
number of sensor nodes in one group is N/NG (<<N)
and the number of hops between two neighboring 
group leaders is much smaller than N/NG, we can 
assume the number of hops between two neighboring 
group leaders is constant. We assume the total number 
of hops along the route between the source node and 
the sink node is NH, then the cost that RREP is 
forwarded to the source node is O(NH), which is O(1)
since in general NH << N if the sensor nodes are 
deployed in a rectangle region (length u  breadth), 
where length is not far away from breadth. The total 
cost is O(N). The computational cost is not relevant to 
the number of black holes since most of the black hole 
attacks are detected only locally. However, the 
computational cost of AODVBH [5] is )( NM 2 . The 
computational comlexity of CoBH [7] is )( NM 2 . The 
computational cost for both of AODVBH [5] and 
CoBH [7] increases when the number of black hole 
attacks increase. 
5.2.2. Storage Overhead. In CoBH [7], each node 
maintains an additional Data Routing Information (DRI) 
table. Each node stores two additional bits in DRI for 
each other node. The total additional storage for 
maintaining DRI for each node is O(2N) bits, that is 
O(N/4) bytes. If there are 1000 sensor nodes, each node 
must maintain additional at least 256 bytes for DRI 
storage. In the HSRBH, all the nodes maintain a shared 
key with the sink node. Each group leaders also need to 
maintain additional inter-group shared key with its 
neighboring group leaders. All the one-hop neighbors 
of the group leader also need to maintain additional 
intra-group shared key. We assume the key size is Sk
bytes. The sensor node other than the group leader 
need the additional key storage O(Sk). The group leader 
needs the additional key storage including shared key 
with the sink node and shared key with its neighboring 
group leader, which is O((1+Nnb)Sk). The one-hop 
neighbors of the group leader needs the additional key 
storage including shared key with the sink node and 
shared key with other one-hop neighbors of the group 
leader, which is O(2Sk). If the key size is 8 bytes [2], 
the node other than the group leader needs additional 8 
bytes storage for key information. Assume that the 
average number of neighboring group leaders for each 
group leader is 6 then each group leader needs to 
maintain additional 56 bytes for key storage. Each one-
hop neighbor of the group leader needs to maintain 
additional 16 bytes for key storage. 
In the sensor network, the storage is only 512 bytes 
RAM, and 512 bytes EEPROM [2]. The HSRBH only 
uses a small part of memory and thus it is suitable to be 
used in the sensor network, whereas CoBH [7] needs 
huge additional storage, which is not suitable for the 
sensor network. AODVBH [5] does not need any 
additional information, Therefore the storage overhead 
is low. However, it only considers single black hole, 
which is obviously not enough to build a secure route 
against different kinds of black hole attacks including 
cooperative black hole attacks. 
6. Performance Evaluations 
The metrics such as route discovery overhead and 
black hole detection time are measured from the 
simulation results. We evaluate the proposed HSRBH 
by comparing it with AODVBH [5] and CoBH [7]. 
6.1. Performance Comparison: Non 
Cooperative Black Holes 
The message overhead to build a secure route 
against multiple non cooperative black hole attacks is 
shown in Figure 3. The message overhead in HSRBH 
includes the message overhead in the initialization 
phase and in the route discovery. The message 
overhead in AODVBH and CoBH includes route 
requests and route replies. The message overhead for 
HSRBH is almost same when the number of black 
holes increases, which is consistent with the 
computation cost analysis result of O(N), where N is 
the number of sensor nodes. But it is much lower than 
the message overhead of the AODVBH scheme and 
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CoBH scheme. This is because in HSRBH the black 
hole node can be detected only locally. But, for both 
AODVBH and CoBH, if the source node gets route 
reply, it will send an additional route request to the 
next hop of the black hole node to verify the route 
reply. When the number of black holes increases, more 
additional route discoveries are triggered, which is 
consistent with the computation cost analysis result of 
AODVBH and CoBH )( NM 2 , where M is the 
number of black hole nodes, and N is the total number 
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Figure 3. Route discoveries overhead 
The average time to detect the black holes is shown 
in Figure 4. HSRBH is faster to detect malicious nodes 
acting as black holes than AODVBH and CoBH. This 
is because in HSRBH the detection of black hole is 
executed only locally. But in AODVBH or CoBH the 
source node needs to send another route request to the 
next hop of the intermediate node to verify the 
authenticity of the route. This verification process 
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Figure 4. Average time to detect black hole 
6.2. Performance Comparison: Cooperative 
Black Holes 
The message overhead for HSRBH protocol is 
much lower than the message overhead for CoBH 
scheme as shown in Figure 5. This is because in 
HSRBH the black hole nodes can be detected locally 
whenever they are single nodes acting as black holes or 
a set of cooperative black holes except the group 
leaders. But, for CoBH, the source node always sends 
an additional route request to the next hop of the black 
hole node until the next hop of the black hole is a 
reliable node [7]. When the number of cooperative 
black holes increases, more additional route discoveries 
are triggered. Therefore, the message overhead in route 
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Figure 5. Messages overhead during route 
discovery 
As shown in Figure 6, HSRBH is faster to detect 
malicious nodes making cooperative black hole attacks 
than CoBH. This is because in HSRBH the detection of 
cooperative black holes is executed only. But in CoBH 
if several nodes cooperatively make a black hole attack, 
the source node sends another route request to the next 
hop of the next hop of black hole node until it finds a 
normal node with a route to the sink. Therefore, the 
time to detect cooperative black holes increases with 
the increase in the number of cooperative black holes. 
This verification process in CoBH greatly delays the 
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Figure 6. Time to detect cooperative black 
holes
7. Related Work 
Perrig et al. [2] presented two security protocols, 
SNEP and ȝTESLA. SNEP provides data 
confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and data 
freshness, while ȝTESLA provides authenticated 
broadcast for severely resource-constrained 
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environments using a time-released key chain. Zhu et 
al. [4] proposed localized encryption and authentication 
protocol (LEAP) and established four types of keys for 
each sensor node. Oliveira et al. [10] proposed a 
solution for securing heterogeneous hierarchical sensor 
network with an arbitrary number of levels. Deng et al. 
[5] proposed a solution for the black hole problem in 
AODV routing protocol. They allowed the intermediate 
node to send a reply message if it had a fresh enough 
route to the destination. But the intermediate node 
could be a malicious node and could send route reply 
even if it had no fresh enough route to the destination 
to make a black hole attack. They proposed a solution 
that the source node would send another route request 
to the next hop of the intermediate node to verify the 
authenticity of the route from the intermediate node to 
the destination node. If the route exists, the 
intermediate node is trusted; otherwise, the reply 
message from the intermediate node is discarded. 
Ramaswamy et al. [7] addressed the problem of 
coordinated attack by multiple black holes acting in 
group in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). They 
proposed a technique using the Data Routing 
Information (DRI) table to identify multiple black 
holes cooperating with each other and discover a safe 
route avoiding cooperative black hole attack.  
8. Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a hierarchical secure 
routing protocol to detect and find a secure path against 
black hole attacks in sensor networks. The protocol 
uses only symmetric key cryptography to discover a 
safe route against black hole attacks. Most of black 
hole attacks except the group leader colludes with other 
nodes to make black hole attack, are detected only 
locally. Therefore, it is much faster in detecting the 
black hole attacks, and the message overhead is very 
low. The proposed protocol also provides the scheme 
to detect the black hole attack caused by the group 
leader colluding with other nodes. The simulation 
results show that the proposed protocol has a much 
better performance for secure route discovery against 
black hole attacks in comparison with the secure 
AODV against black hole presented in [5] and the 
protocol given in [7] against cooperative black hole 
attacks.
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